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When Exclusionary Conduct Meets the Exclusive
Rights of Intellectual Property:
Morris v. PGA Tour and the Limits of Free Riding
As an Antitrust Business Justification*
Shubha Ghosh**

I.

INTRODUCTION: STATING THE PROBLEM

Under antitrust laws, a frequent business justification for
exclusionary conduct is the prevention of free riding. Free riding is the
unauthorized benefit from the efforts of someone else, usually in the
form of a service or intangible asset, and is considered a problem
because the free rider obtains a benefit for which someone else pays the
cost. The benefit obtained by the free rider is sometimes argued to be a
value that the creator of the benefit is entitled to license. Vertical
restraints on retailers,1 unilateral refusals to deal,2 and horizontal
agreements 3 are, in various contexts, allowed to ensure that relevant
* This article expands on A Rose is a Rose is... : the Thorny Case of Morris Communications

Corp. v. Professional Golf Association Tour, Inc., 1 ERASMUS L. & ECON. REv. 287 (2004)
available at http://www.eler.org/index.php. Portions of the original article are reprinted with
permission of the Erasmus Law and Economics Review subject to ELER Public License 1.0.
** Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. The author would
like to thank the editors of the Loyola Law Journal, particularly Jan Stewart, for their hard work
on this article and their incredible patience in accommodating his overseas travel plans. Thanks
also go out to Spencer Waller for his organization of the 2005 Loyola Antitrust Colloquium,
where an early version of this paper was presented and to Matthew Sag and Michael Carrier for
their comments at the colloquium.
1. A vertical restraint is a contractual restriction placed by a company on another company in
the chain of distribution, such as a restriction imposed by a manufacturer on a retailer dictating
where or to whom the retailer can sell. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 4344 (1977).
2. A unilateral refusal to deal is a decision by a company not to contract with another
company. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 463 n.8 (1992).
Such a refusal can give rise to an antitrust violation if the refusal is anticompetitive. Id. at 483
n.32.
3. A horizontal agreement is an agreement among competitors that affects some aspect of the
market, such as the price, distribution arrangements, or product and service standards. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984).
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parties do not misappropriate service or quality investments. For
example, the Supreme Court allows territorial restraints if they provide
incentives to retailers to invest in necessary add-on services for
informationally constrained customers. 4 These restraints are consistent
with the goals of antitrust law and comply with the important "rule of
reason" because they promote inter-brand competition, albeit at the
expense of intra-brand competition. 5 Antitrust law arguably allows both
vertical and horizontal restraints to prevent free riding and it is now safe
to say that the right to exclude is protected from antitrust
scrutiny when
6
riding.
free
of
threat
the
cure
to
exercised
is
right
the
This rule, however, creates the potential for conflict with the right to
exclude recognized under intellectual property law.
Intellectual
property law also justifies exclusionary restraints as responses to free
riding, but that justification developed out of the desire to prevent the
misappropriation of creative and innovative efforts rather than the desire
to promote trade. The Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in Morris
Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc.7 illustrates the results of this
conflict. In Morris, the free riding justification was successfully evoked
to prevent a newspaper from reporting real-time golf scores. While
patent law may have protected the PGA's data collection system, Morris
Communications did not want to copy that system but instead wanted to
copy the data itself, which is not subject to copyright protection.' The
Morris decision thus resulted in the unnecessary, and avoidable, use of
the business justification to expand intellectual property law at the
expense of antitrust law principles. This holding conflicts with the
Supreme Court's caution that "only Congress should make a decision to
'sacrifice competition in one portion of the economy for greater
4. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-58.
5. Id. at 54.
6. Initially, the Supreme Court was reluctant to allow horizontal restraints as a response to free
riding as seen from the decision in UnitedStates v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1971). Soon
after Topco, however, the Court implicitly recognized the magnitude of free riding issues
associated with the creation of a new product. Then, in Sylvania the Court expressly allowed the
use of vertical restraints as a means to prevent free riding. Cont'l T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). This holding causes some thinkers to suggest that the prevention of free
riding may now also give wide justification for horizontal restraints.
7. 364 F.3d 1288, 1295-96 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
8. Id. at 1291-92. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
(holding that factual compilations are not copyrightable unless the facts are organized in an
original manner); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that a patent can
be obtained for anything under the sun that is man-made except for laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas). Data is generally unprotected under copyright and patent law.
See also Shubha Ghosh, A Rose is a Rose is... : the Thorny Case of Morris Communications
Corp. v. Professional Golf Association Tour, Inc., 1 ERASMUS L. & ECON. REv. 287, 290 (2004)
(arguing that the Court allowed the PGA to protect information that is in the public domain).
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9
competition in another portion,' not the courts or private parties."
However, the Eleventh Circuit in Morris allowed private parties to
make this questionable sacrifice, which illustrates the problem
with the
10
free riding business justification analysis in antitrust law.

This Article builds on and expands the author's earlier analysis of
Morris and concludes that in resolving the conflict between antitrust
and intellectual property law, the Eleventh Circuit improperly and
unnecessarily expanded the scope of intellectual property law. 11 First,
Part II of this Article provides a brief introduction to antitrust and
intellectual property law and explains how exclusionary restraints have
been allowed under each regime to respond to the problem of free
riding. 12 Part II also discusses case law considering the relationship
between antitrust and intellectual property law in both the United States
and Europe. 13 Parts III and IV of this Article discuss Morris itself and
analyze the court's holding. 14 Finally, Part V provides guiding
principles for future courts to use in order to properly adjudicate cases
with this dynamic and argues that rather than following the steps of the
Morris court, courts should instead more carefully scrutinize business
justifications presented by defendants in order to avoid the unnecessary
15
expansion of intellectual property law at the expense of antitrust law.
II. FREE RIDING As AN ANTITRUST BUSINESS JUSTIFICATION
The conflict in Morris developed in part from the overlap of the
antitrust and intellectual property regimes. In order to best evaluate the
Eleventh Circuit's resolution of that conflict it is necessary to first
understand the underlying antitrust and intellectual property interests
themselves.
This Part provides an introduction to antitrust and
intellectual property law and shows how each body of law has
responded to the problem of free riding. 16 This Part then describes key
9. KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW
EVOLUTION 118-19 (2003) (quoting United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611
(1971)).
10. Morris,364 F.3d at 1298.
11. Ghosh, supra note 8, at 289-90.
12. See infra Part II.A-B (introducing antitrust and intellectual property law and addressing
free riding in both areas of law).
13. See infra Part II.C (describing the relationship between antitrust and intellectual property
law in the United States and the European Union).
14. See infra Parts III-IV (discussing Morris and analyzing the Court's holding).
15. See infra Part V (presenting an alternative to the Morris approach to allow scrutiny of
business justifications by defendants to avoid expanding intellectual property law at the expense
of antitrust law).
16. See infra Part II.A (introducing antitrust and intellectual property law).
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intellectual property, including
cases at the intersection of antitrust and
17
some cases from the European Union.
A. Antitrust and Intellectual PropertyLaw

Antitrust and intellectual property laws provide a scheme for the
regulation of markets and innovation at the federal level. Federal
antitrust laws were first enacted in 1890 with the passage of the

Sherman Antitrust Act. 18 There have been several revisions since 1890,
the most prominent being the passage of the Clayton Act and the
Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914.19 Together, these various
federal laws police anticompetitive behavior in the marketplace. The
behavior may be either unilateral (undertaken by one firm) or collusive

(undertaken by a group of firms acting in concert).2 ° Unilateral conduct
is usually termed monopolization, which is illegal if the firm has market
power and acts in a way harmful to competition. 2 1 Collusive behavior
is illegal if the firms enter into an agreement that is per se illegal, such
as an agreement to fix the price of a product or service, or if the firms
enter into an agreement whose anticompetitive harms outweigh any
2
procompetitive benefits.223
The weighing of these harms and benefits is
reason.
called the rule of
Intellectual property laws are a century older than federal antitrust
laws. Congress enacted the first patent and copyright laws in 1790 with
several revisions thereafter. 24 Congress enacted federal trademark laws

17. See infra Parts I.A-C (describing the business justification defense and free riding; and
comparing United States and European Union cases).
18. ELEANOR M. FOX ET AL., U.S. ANTITRUST iN GLOBAL CONTEXT 11 (2d ed. 2004). See
also Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000 & West Supp. 2005) ("Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.").
19. Fox ET AL., supra note 18, at 49-50 (noting that the Clayton Act had many similar goals
of the Sherman Act but was worded more precisely to prohibit mergers with an anticompetitive
effect). See also Clayton Act 15 U.S.C. § 12 (disallowing mergers with an anticompetitive
effect); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2000) (creating the Federal Trade
Commission and empowering it to bring suit for unfair methods of competition).
20. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), for an
example of unilateral anticompetitive behavior. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), for an example of anticompetitive behavior undertaken by a group.
21. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. at 112.
22. See Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 344 (stating that the price agreement was
per se illegal); see also Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241 (1918) (using
a broad analysis to determine whether the harm to trade outweighed any benefits to trade).
23. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (announcing the
rule of reason).
24. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003) (stating that Congress's first copyright
statute, adopted in 1790, provided a fourteen year term of protection of any publications). The
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in the late nineteenth century, but these were challenged as
unconstitutional under the narrow interpretation of the Commerce
Clause that existed at the time.2 5 Congress passed modem trademark
statutes in 1946 through the Lanham Act. 26 Patents, copyrights, and
trademarks form a cohesive package of federal intellectual property
laws. Each set of laws gives the owner of intellectual property the right
to exclude others from using, making, selling, or importing the subject
matter protected by the relevant statute. 2 7 For example, patent law
allows the owner of a patent to exclude others from using, making,
selling, or importing the novel, useful, and nonobvious invention
protected by the patent. 28 Copyright law allows the owner of a
copyright to exclude others from using, making, selling, or importing an
original work of expression. 29 Finally, trademark law protects the rights
of the trademark owner to brand his or her product or service in the
marketplace. 30 A trademark owner is allowed under law to prohibit an
on a product or
actual or potential competitor from using the trademark
31
consumers.
confuse
to
likely
is
that
way
a
in
service
Antitrust and intellectual property laws are complementary at one
level, but at tension on another level. Both bodies of law police the
marketplace and structure competitive behavior in the development and
distribution of products and services. 32 However, the right to exclude
given by intellectual property can be the basis for anticompetitive
behavior that can give rise to an antitrust violation. 3 3 Yet, what is
important to recognize is that intellectual property is not inherently
anticompetitive. Rather, the way in which intellectual property rights

authority to pass this law derives from the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution. Id.
See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 stating: "[Congress shall have Power] To promote the
Progress of Science... by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
25. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97-98 (1879) (striking down Congress's
amended 1876 trademark statute as outside of the authority bestowed upon Congress in the
Commerce Clause).
26. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2000 & West Supp. 2005).
27.

PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES,

pt. 3 (5th ed. 2004).
28. Id. at 396-97.

29. Id. at 585-87.
30. Id. at 220.
31. Id. at 265-66.
32. A. Douglas Melamed & Ali M. Stoeppelwerth, The CSU Case: Facts, Formalism and the
Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 407, 414-15
(2002).
33. See Fox ET AL., supra note 18, at 91 (discussing the use that patents play in cartels and
allowing patent holders to "pool their patents as a strategy to avoid competition").
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are exercised is what creates tensions with antitrust law.
Although trademark law does not give the creators of brands the right
to divide markets territorially, trademark law does recognize and
promote the value of distinguishing marks to consumers. 34 The concept
of secondary meaning is particularly important to the goals of trademark
law. 35 Secondary meaning is established through brand identification
by consumers and is essential to establish trademark rights when a
brand name is not particularly arbitrary or suggestive. 36 In order to

create secondary meaning, the user of a brand name must heavily
market the brand in conjunction with particular goods and services and
establish consumer identification. 37 In this way, brands are like quality
or product service, a dimension of a product that consumers demand
and value in their purchasing decisions. The free riding arguments that
justify exclusionary conduct necessary to ensure quality and product
servicing also support exclusionary conduct necessary to promote
3

brands. W

B. The Business Justification in Antitrust and Intellectual Property
The concept of free riding plays an important role in antitrust and
intellectual property laws. Free riding occurs when someone captures a
benefit without paying for it. This definition may sound like theft and
certainly all theft is a form of free riding. But free riding as a concept is
controversial when property rights are not as clearly defined as in the
case of theft.3 9
34. See Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasionin Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020,
2028 (2005) (discussing trademark law and the value of branding).
35. Id. at 2029.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2036.
38. HYLTON, supra note 9, at 25-26.
39. For example, suppose I work hard on an idea for a better design for an automobile cup
holder. I come up with the idea, and before I patent it, I tell someone my design. If the person I
told makes use of my idea, then he is arguably free riding. He has obtained the benefit of the idea
without expending any cost to obtain it. Whether this form of free riding is legally actionable
depends upon my rights in the idea. If it has not been patented nor the subject of a confidentiality
agreement, there may be no legal claim against the person who is allegedly free riding. Take
another more subtle example. Suppose you own a retail outlet selling computer hardware. A
customer comes into your store and asks about state-of-the-art equipment and pricing. He takes
the information you give him and uses it to buy what he needs from another store. In this case,
both the customer and the competitor have free ridden on your efforts. Each has obtained and
made use of the information that neither has paid for. The customer has benefited from the
information without paying for it (except for the time spent listening to you). The competitor has
benefited from the sale without having to inform the customer about the product. Most likely this
will not be a violation of law unless the information is somehow protected, meaning that you
were given a property right in the information shared with the customer.
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Free riding informs antitrust and intellectual property law in several

ways. In antitrust law, free riding is often a business justification for
agreements that are arguably anticompetitive. The free riding rationale
usually accepted within antitrust law is to allow restrictions that
promote the creation of valuable services, such as the collection and

publishing of real-time golf scores. For example, a restriction on a
former employee preventing him from competing directly with the
former employer is arguably anticompetitive. But it is often justified as

a way of keeping the employee from free riding off of the information
and training obtained from the previous employer.
Free riding justifications for exclusionary conduct rest on the selfregulation of an information-based market failure. In past cases like
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., Consultants & Designers,
Inc. v. Butler Service Group,4 1 United States v. Topco Associates,42 and
others, 4 3 restrictions on private behavior are designed to resolve
problems of asymmetric information in the marketplace. 44
An
exclusionary restriction, such as a territorial restraint on trade or a

covenant not to compete, creates the incentive to provide a service that
45
may not otherwise exist because of the possibility of rent dissipation.
Antitrust law tolerates such exclusionary restrictions as long as the
benefits of creating positive incentives for the provision of services are
not outweighed by anticompetitive effects on the marketplace. 46 This
formulation
restates the classic rule of reason in terms of the free riding
47
rationale.

Of course, not all free riding rationales provide a justification for

40. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
41. 720 F.2d 1553, 1562 (1 Ith Cir. 1983).
42. 405 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1972).
43. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 464 (1941) (ruling that
textile manufacturers rules against dealings with "style pirates" was a violation of the Sherman
Act); see also Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990) (stating that an
agreement not to enter the Georgia market was not allowable under antitrust laws).
44. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND
INFORMATION 295 (1992) (discussing informational asymmetry and contract design).
45. See MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POuCY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 334-337 (2004)
(arguing that exclusive contracts might be efficient because they can stimulate the investments in
services provided by a retailer).
46. There are many types of asymmetric information, including information differences
between consumers and sellers, among searchers in a matching market, and among collaborators
in a business enterprise. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977)
(adopting a rule of reason approach that requires consideration of pro- and anticompetitive
effects).
47. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979)
(explaining the rationale behind the rule of reason).
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anticompetitive conduct. The classic price cartel 4 8 is riddled with
problems of free riding and rent dissipation, but restrictions designed to
promote a price cartel are per se illegal under the antitrust laws. 49 Price
cartels are presumed not to have economic justifications since price, as
the Court stated in
Socony- Vacuum, is the "central nervous system" of a
50
economy.
market
In intellectual property law, free riding is often given as the
justification for granting the right to exclude to the intellectual property
owner. The most common justification for the exclusive rights granted
under intellectual property law is the prevention of the misappropriation
of creative and innovative effort that results in products, whether
original writings or novel, non-obvious, and useful discoveries. 5 1 For
example, the inventor of a new drug, the producer of a movie, and the
creator of a new brand have each expended time and money in their
respective creations. By giving each a right to exclude under patent,
copyright, and trademark laws respectively, the law prevents the second
comer from simply copying the drug, movie, or brand without paying
the costs of development.
But just as the possibility of a free riding problem does not mandate
the laxity of antitrust laws,52 so the free riding justification should not
be used to expand intellectual property. In some instances, what may be
deemed free riding is important for the dissemination of knowledge and
products. In some ways, private agreements among parties can realize
the goals of intellectual property law in preventing free riding. Antitrust
law similarly allows private agreements by recognizing the prevention
of free riding as a business justification for an anticompetitive
agreement.
Although at a very basic level the prevention of free riding seems
sensible, the problem can be exaggerated. The concept of free riding
masks a more pertinent question: should the creator have the right to
exclude others from use of the creation? Patent, copyright, and
trademark laws have answered this "should" question within the
structures of the respective statutory schemes that provide extensive
conditions for when the right to exclude should be granted and when it
should be limited. The question posed by the decision in the Morris
48. See HYLTON, supra note 9, at 68 (defining a cartel as "a group of firms that seeks to
increase profits by restricting price and output competition amount themselves").
49. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
50. Id. at 224 n.59.
51. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, at 17-19 (stating that intellectual property law encourages
investment by prohibiting misuse of one's ideas).
52. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing the example of price cartels).

2006]

Free Riding As an Antitrust Business Justification

731

case is to what extent intellectual property law should allow the free
riding justification to create a legal right to exclude that may potentially
be in conflict with antitrust law.
C. Cases Consideringthe IntersectionBetween Antitrust and
Intellectual Property
The tension between intellectual property and antitrust that the
Eleventh Circuit ignored in Morris can better be understood by first
considering other cases in which free riding issues arose in the context
of exclusionary conduct. To emphasize this point, this Part will first
discuss the Supreme Court's decision in Topco5 3 to show how the Court
misunderstood the relationship among antitrust law, intellectual
property and the free riding problem. 54 Then this Part will turn to three
cases cited in Morris as precedent. 55 This Part will conclude with a
description of a circuit split concerning the intersection of antitrust and
intellectual property
law and a brief introduction to European Union law
56
on the subject.
1. The Trouble with Topco
When intellectual property is implicated, the free riding justification
for exclusionary conduct should be scrutinized. The Supreme Court's
decision in Topco,5 7 however, illustrates the danger of following this
proposition without completely a critical analysis.
At issue in Topco was a consortium of small grocers who, in order to
develop a strong national brand to compete with the larger chains,
agreed to restrict territorial competition and wholesaling among its
members. 5 8 The intellectual property problem at issue in Topco was the
creation of a new brand. 59 The consortium expended much time and
money in the creation of the brand. Creation of a brand requires the
creation of brand identification with consumers.
Brand identification,
in turn, is created by limiting the sources for the branded product in

53. United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
54. Id. at 596.
55. See infra Part Il.C.2 (discussing the cases cited in Morris as precedent).
56. See infra Parts ll.C.3-4 (describing the circuit split concerning the intersection between
antitrust and intellectual property law and introducing European Union law).
57, Topco, 405 U.S. at 596.
58. Id. at 598-4600.
59. Id. at 602.
60. Id. at 604-05. National retailers are at an advantage because they have a greater
opportunity to create a brand awareness with which consumers can identify. Id.
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61
order to create loyalty between the customer and the company.
Territorial restrictions on where the branded product is sold and by
whom are necessary to create customer loyalty. Furthermore, free
riding by one retailer of the branded product of quality and services
provided by another retailer of the same branded product may be a
problem in creating customer loyalty. 62 Therefore, it is often argued
that territorial 63restrictions are important as a tool to limit the possibility
of free riding.

The Court, however, struck down the agreement as a horizontal
agreement in restraint of trade that was a per se violation of the antitrust
laws. 64 The Court did not accept the grocers' argument that the
restrictions were necessary to enforce the consortium and create
effective competition against larger grocers. 65 Such competitionenhancing restrictions on competitive behavior were for Congress to
66
decide and not the subject of self-regulation, according to the Court.
The Topco case, in short, illustrates a case where intellectual property
laws, albeit
free riding arguments were rejected in favor of antitrust
67
inappropriately according to some scholars and jurists.
Cases subsequent to Topco illustrate the special place of trademarks
for the application of the free riding justification in antitrust
jurisprudence. In Palmer v. BRG of Georgia,68 the Supreme Court
applied Topco to a covenant not to compete that was part of a
franchising agreement. 69 The Court held that the covenant was a
horizontal territorial division that per se violated antitrust law. 70 The
covenant allowed the franchisee to use the trademark, but not to sell the
branded service within the state of Georgia. While the agreement in
Topco prevented use of the mark when competitors sold goods in the
same territory, 7 1 the agreement in Palmer prevented all competition

61.

Id.

62. See Matter of Polygram Holding, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 115,453 (FrC 2003)
(rejecting the argument that free riding would harm competition).
63. Topco, 405 U.S. at 605.
64. Id. at 608-09.
65. However, in his dissent, Justice Burger did recognize that the restrictions were necessary
and accepted as a justification for the restrictive arrangement. Compare id. at 608-09 (applying a
per se rule to the restraint), with id. at 623-24 (Burger, J., dissenting) (recognizing a collective
action problem as justification for the restrictive arrangements).
66. Id. at611.
67. See HYLTON, supra note 9, at 118-19 (criticizing the Court's analysis in Topco).
68. 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 49-50.
70. Id. (citing Topco, 405 U.S. at 608).
71. Topco, 405 U.S. at 597-600.
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within the same territory, regardless of the use of the mark.72 The key
difference between the agreement in Topco and that in Palmer is that
the latter severed the use of the brand from the sale of the service and
therefore was a restriction on competition unrelated to promotion of the
mark.7 3
This distinction is also illustrated by Rothery Storage & Van Co. v.
Atlas Van Lines.74 In Rothery, the court upheld a territorial restriction,
which was part of an agreement for the promotion of a brand.7 5 The
court recognized that territorial restrictions could be necessary for brand
development and the creation of customer loyalty and expressed
skepticism with the viability of the Topco decision. 76 The court stated
that the7 per se illegality of horizontal restraints was overruled by later
7
cases.
In conclusion, free riding justifications seem to allow some horizontal
territorial divisions implemented for the purposes of brand development
and promotion. This result is consistent with the goals of trademark
law.
This result also demonstrates that antitrust free riding
justifications should be closely scrutinized when intellectual property is
implemented. In the case of trademark law, free riding justifications do
not create a subject matter conflict and, in general, are consistent with
Congress's purpose in enacting federal trademark protection.
2. Precedent Cited in Morris
The Eleventh Circuit cited three prior cases in assessing and
ultimately affirming the PGA's asserted business justification for
refusing to deal with Morris: Sylvania,7 9 Butler,8 0 and Trinko.8 1 The
court relied on each of these cases to establish the proposition that the
prevention of free riding can be a valid business justification for

72. Palmer,498 U.S. at 47.
73. Id.
74. 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
75. Id. at 212.
76. Id. at 226. The petitioners in this case cited Topco for the proposition that all horizontal
restraints are per se illegal. Id. The court then proceeds to state that to the extent Topco stands
for this proposition it has been overruled. Id.
77. Id.; see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)
(foregoing the per se rule in recognition that partnerships can require horizontal restraints).
78. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on
the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REv. 777, 786-88 (2004) (discussing the goals of trademark law).
79. Cont'l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
80. Consultants & Designers, Inc. v. Butler Serv. Group, 720 F.2d 1553 (1 th Cir. 1983).
81. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 401

(2004).
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refusing to deal.8 2
At issue in Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. was a
territorial restraint imposed by a manufacturer on retailers of a
product. 83 The Supreme Court upheld the restraint and established that
vertical territorial restraints were subject to the rule of reason as
opposed to the Topco per se rule that applies to horizontal territorial
restraints. 84 The Court justified the relaxed standard of review for
vertical restraints by reasoning that there were valid economic reasons
for vertical restrictions while there was no economic reason, except as a
means of restricting supply and raising price, for horizontal agreements
85
among competitors to restrict sales based on territory.
The primary economic justification was the prevention of free riding
in the provision of services by the retailer to customers. 86 If retailers of
a product were not divided territorially, the Court reasoned, one retailer
would have the incentive to free ride on the service and advertising
efforts of other retailers. 87 Vertical territorial restrictions would reduce
this incentive by making it more difficult for one retailer to steal
customers from another retailer by being able to reduce price by
skimping on service. 88 A manufacturer could use territorial restrictions
to standardize services across all retailers. 89 The Court further reasoned
that these restrictions within a brand promoted competition across
brands by allowing manufacturers to establish good will and a customer
base for a given brand. 90 Given this justification for vertical territorial
restrictions, the Court concluded that it would be economically
counterproductive
to strike down all vertical territorial restrictions under
91
rule.
se
per
a
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Consultants & Designers, Inc. v.
Butler Service Group also centered on the need to prevent free riding,
9
but in the context of the enforceability of covenants not to compete.
The court upheld a placement agency's restrictions that prevented the

82.
83.
84.
85.

Morris Commc'ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1295-96 (11 th Cir. 2004).
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 42.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 54-56.

86. Id. at 55.
87.

Id.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 57.
92. Consultants & Designers, Inc. v. Butler Serv. Group, 720 F.2d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir.
1983).
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agency's employees from accepting permanent employment with a
company at which they were placed as temporary employees. 9 3 As in
Sylvania, the Butler court applied a rule of reason analysis to the
restriction on the grounds that there was a valid business justification
for the restriction in preventing free riding. 94 Since the placement
agency invested in identifying an employee's skills and matching an
employee with an employer, the restriction, according to the court,
allowed the placement agency to recoup its investment in the
by preventing an employer from free riding
recruitment of an employee
95
on the agency's efforts.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit in Morris analyzed the Trinko
decision. 96 In Trinko, the Court rejected an antitrust claim brought by a
local telephone carrier against Verizon for failure to comply with the
interconnection rules of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 9 7 The
plaintiff argued that Verizon's failure to allow interconnection was an
illegal act of monopolization. 98 The Court failed to find a claim, stating
that the Sherman Act "does not give judges carte blanche to insist that a
monopolist alter its way of doing business whenever some other
approach might yield greater competition. '99 What this statement
means has been a source of controversy among commentators. 10 0 On
its face, the Court seems to be saying that the Sherman Act requires
judges to defer to monopolists to further the goals of competition, an
interpretation at odds with the pro-competition purpose of the Sherman
Act. r ol A more limited reading of Trinko, one consistent with antitrust
law, would deny judges carte blanche to second guess Congress's
decision on whether to identify certain industries, such as

93. Id. at 1564.
94. Compare Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59 (applying the rule of reason analysis to vertical
territorial restraints), with Butler, 720 F.2d at 1562 (applying a rule of reason analysis to the
restriction).
95. Butler, 720 F.2d at 1558.
96. Morris Commc'ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1294 (1lth Cir. 2004).
97. 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2000); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398, 401 (2004).
98. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 398.
99. Id. at415-16.
100. See, e.g., Simon Genevaz, Against Immunity for Unilateral Refusals to Deal in
Intellectual Property: Why Antitrust Law Should Not DistinguishBetween IP and Other Property
Rights, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 741 (2004) (arguing against the immunity rule for unilateral
refusals to deal in intellectual property).
101. See John Thorne, A CategoricalRule Limiting Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Verizon v.
Trinko, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 289 (2005) (stating that the Court held that an entire type of
conduct could not meet the anticompetitive conduct element of Section 2).
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10 2
telecommunications, as monopolies.

3. Circuit Split
Usually, the conflict between antitrust and intellectual property
entails the intellectual property owner asserting his patents and
copyrights as a shield to the antitrust regime. For example, in both the
Kodak °3 and Xerox 10 4 cases, a photocopier company claimed that it
could deny independent service providers access to its machines in
order to protect the patented and copyrighted technologies. In the Ninth
Circuit case, Eastman Kodak Company refused to sell replacement parts
to independent service organizations (ISOs) to prevent the ISOs from
competing with Kodak's own service offerings. 10 5 Likewise, in a
Federal Circuit case, Xerox Corporation sought to enforce its company
policy of not selling parts
unique to its copiers to ISOs unless they were
10 6
end-users of the copiers.
However, despite the similarities in the factual circumstances of both
cases, the courts differed in their holdings, splitting on whether the
invocation of intellectual property rights acts as a shield to the antitrust
laws. 10 7 At one end of the split is the Ninth Circuit ruling in Kodak,
which refused to accept Kodak's intellectual property protections as a
defense to the antitrust claim. 10 8 At the other end is the Federal Circuit,
which came very close to creating an antitrust immunity based on
intellectual property in the Xerox case. 10 9 This circuit split illustrates
the differing outcomes that can occur when antitrust law implicates
intellectual property concerns.
4. European Union Examples
Finally, two European Union cases deal with conflicts between
antitrust and intellectual property law. In Magill11 and IMS1 1 1 the
102. Id. at 289 (stating that Trinko arose in the specialized context of telecommunications).
103. Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1990).
104. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig. (Xerox), 203 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
105. Kodak, 903 F.2d at 614.
106. Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1324.
107. Compare Kodak, 903 F.2d at 617 (holding that intellectual property is not a defense to
the antitrust laws), with Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1329 (considering creating an antitrust immunity
based on intellectual property law).
108. Kodak, 903 F.2d at 619. The court found that Kodak's refusal to sell parts to ISOs was
pretextual and that a recovery of investment costs could not justify its policy. Id.
109. Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1329. The court found that an "'author's desire to exclude others
from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business justification .
I..'
Id. at 1329
(quoting Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994)).
110. Joined Cases C-241/91P & C-242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann and Indep. Television
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European Court of Justice (ECJ) demonstrates an alternative tactic used
to reconcile the tensions between intellectual property and competition
policy. The two cases are particularly pertinent to an understanding of
the Morris case because of their relevance to rights over data.
In Magill, the data at issue was television broadcast schedules and
their distribution by television stations to the local newspapers and other
media. 112 Magill, a publisher, obtained and published the data in
violation of an embargo and was threatened with a suit for copyright
infringement. 113 His subsequent challenge of the embargo to the
European Commission as a violation of European competition law led
to the imposition of a compulsory license for the use of the scheduling
information. 1 14 The license was upheld by the European Court of
Justice, which found the television stations had a de facto monopoly
failure to license
over the information itself and held that the stations'
115
the information was an abuse of dominant position.
The European Court of Justice's 2004 decision in the IMS case
strengthens the rights of access to information secured by the Magill
decision. In IMS, the ECJ held that the use of brick structure, which
divided Germany geographically into zones, or bricks, for the purposes
of marketing and selling, to organize and present pharmaceutical data
by two distributors of pharmaceutical data was "indispensable" and that
failure to license the data structure was an abuse of dominant
position. 1 16 The ECJ added that the indispensability of a data structure
to the costs and efforts needed to create an
could be shown by reference
117
alternative structure.
III. THE CASE OF MORRIS V. PGA TOURS
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Morris provides an important
example of the misuse of the free riding analysis in antitrust law. This
Part presents the Morris case and its context in the jurisprudence of free
riding.

Publ'ns Ltd. v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys. (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. 1-743.
Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co KG (IMS),
lIl.
2004 E.C.R. 1-5039.
112. Magill, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743. The distribution of scheduling information was subject to an
embargo on the timing and use of the data, much like the contractual restrictions on the real-time
golf scores under the OLSR.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. IMS, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039.
117. Id.
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A. The Hot Facts
The Morris case deals with information, specifically real-time golf
scores in tournaments sponsored and organized by the Professional Golf
18
Association (PGA), a private organization in the United States."
Since golf is played over a vast course, the collection and reporting of
real-time scores poses a challenge, aggravated by the fact that PGA
rules prohibit cell phones and other electronic forms of communication
during game play. 19 To resolve this dilemma, the PGA in the early
1980s created the Real-Time Scoring System (RTSS), which consists of
a group of volunteer workers that follow the players during the game,
writing down the scores at the end of each green, and then relaying the
scores via hand-held wireless radios. 12 Because of the large number of
players in a tournament, the scores are trickled out to the public through
posted scoreboards12 1around the greens and eventually on the Internet at
the PGA website.
Newsgathering organizations, both traditional and web-based, like to
report the scores as soon as possible. 122 The PGA controls the access of
news organizations and the dissemination of the scores by permitting
only credentialed news organizations to have access to the collected
scores. 12 3 Prior to 1999, any credentialed news organization could view
the scores as they were gathered through the RTSS and retransmit them
directly through their Internet servers.1 4 In 1999, the PGA entered into
an exclusive syndication arrangement with USA Today for the
retransmission of the scores. 12 5 Other news organizations were subject
to the Online Service Regulations (OLSR), also enacted by the PGA in
1999, which stated that scoring information could appear on a non-PGA
related website either no sooner than 30 minutes after the actual
occurrence of the shots or when the information became legally
available as public information. 12 6 In 2000, the OLSR were amended to
include a prohibition against any distribution or transfer of scoring
information to any party other than a credentialed news organization

118.
2002).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Morris Commc'ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d. 1269, 1273 (M.D. Fla.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at
Id.
Id. at

1273-74.
1273.

1274.
1274-75.
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1 27
without the written consent of the PGA.
Morris Communications
Corporation
(Morris),
a Georgia
corporation, publishes several traditional
and Internet-based
newspapers.
Prior to 1999, Morris gathered golf scores from the
RTSS and disseminated them to many local newspapers that sought to
report on PGA tournaments. 129 In 2000, Morris was reprimanded by
PGA for selling golf scores to The Denver Post in violation of the
OLSR.' 3 0 The PGA consented to Morris' sales on the condition that it
obtained the information from the PGA web site rather than through
RTSS. 13 1 Because of the delays in posting scores to the PGA web site,
Morris requested that it have access to RTSS information for sale to
third parties.1 32 The PGA refused, stating that Morris could have access
to the RTSS only for use by Morris publications under the timing and
sale restrictions of the OLSR. Morris subsequently sued the PGA for
antitrust violations, claiming that the PGA's refusal to deal
constituted a
133
monopolization of the market for real-time golf scores.

B. The DistrictCourt's Cold Disposition
Morris claimed that the PGA's OLSR constituted monopolization of
the market for real-time golf scores under Section Two of the Sherman
Act. 134 A monopolization claim is established by showing that the
defendant has monopoly power in the relevant market and engaged in
"the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident." 135 Since the PGA had exclusive
access to the real-time scores, establishing market power was not an
issue. 136 The question was identifying the bad acts that constituted
"willful acquisition or maintenance" by the PGA of its market power. 13 7
Morris argued that the PGA had engaged in two bad acts in violation
127. Id. at 1275.
128. Id. at 1272.
129. Id. at 1274.
130. Id. at 1275.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. See also Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (prohibiting monopolization and
attempts at monopolization).
135. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
136. Morris Commc'ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d. 1269, 1283 (M.D. Fla.
2002).
137. Id. at 1283-84 (discussing the two tests used to establish the existence of "willful
acquisition or maintenance").

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 37

of the statute. The first was an intent to monopolize based on Aspen
Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Co., a famous Supreme Court decision
holding that a monopolist had a duty to cooperate with competitors in
certain situations. 13
The second was control of essential facilities
based on a number of appellate decisions holding that a monopolist
cannot deny a9 competitor access to a facility that is essential to
3
competition.
As a defense to a Section Two claim, the PGA presented a business
justification for its acts. 140 The district court found this justification to
be a valid one in that the PGA had an interest in recouping its
investment in creating the RTSS for collecting and disseminating realtime golf scores. 14 Allowing companies like Morris to free ride off
these efforts by posting and selling the golf scores undercut the PGA's
investment. 14 2 Therefore, the PGA had a valid business justification in
adopting and enforcing the
OLSR and was not in violation of Section
Two of the Sherman Act. 14 3
C. The Eleventh Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the decision. 14 4 The business justification accepted by the Eleventh
Circuit is reminiscent of free riding justifications for intellectual
property. 14 5 The court reasoned that the RTSS required extensive
investment of resources by the PGA to create, and in order to recoup its
investment, the PGA had to limit access by preventing free riding of the
real-time golf scores. 146 The high fixed cost, low imitation cost
argument that the court enunciated is often the justification for

138. See generally Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)
(holding that a monopolist had a duty to cooperate with competitors in certain situations).
139. Although the Supreme Court has not adopted the essential facilities doctrine, several
lower federal courts have appealed to the doctrine. See Verizon Commc'n, Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (describing the doctrine but neither endorsing or
repudiating it).
140. PGA Tour, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 1278.
141. Id. at 1281.
142. Id. at 1280.
143. See id. (reasoning that Morris does not expend its own resources but instead free rides on
the PGA's compilation of golf scores).
144. Morris Commc'ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11 th Cir. 2004).
145.

See generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83

TEX. L. REv. 1031, 1033-1036 (2005) (discussing the arguments justifying intellectual property);
see also supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (outlining the difference between patent,
copyright, and trademark law).
146. Morris, 364 F.3d at 1296.
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147
copyright and patent restrictions on imitation and other uses.

IV. ANALYSIS OF MORRIS: THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE
REVERSED THE LOWER COURT'S HOLDING

A. Morris's Free-Riding Rationale Varied Significantlyfrom that in
Butler & Sylvania
Each of the cases the Morris court relied on is factually
distinguishable and involved a very different free riding problem.
Although there was a superficial similarity between the free riding at
issue in Morris and the free riding justifications in Sylvania and Butler,
there were two critical distinctions that required different treatment of
the business justification in Morris. First, the facts of both Sylvania and
Butler dealt with free riding on a service. 148 Absent the restrictions,
neither defendant in those cases would have had the incentive to provide
services that were critical for the development of the relevant market.
In Sylvania, the loss of service would have weakened inter-brand
competition by making it more difficult for new brands to be
established. 14 9 In Butler, the loss of service would have vitiated the
value-added provided by the placement agency by allowing potential
employees
to use the agency to find permanent rather than temporary
0

jobs.

15

By contrast, in Morris, it is not clear that allowing access to data
would have eliminated the provision of the service by the PGA in
establishing the RTSS. Admittedly, the system may have become less
profitable, but it was far from clear that the value added from the service
would have vanished. For instance, had Morris been allowed access,
the PGA would still be able to market their golf scores on their own
website. 15 1 The key difference was that the restriction in Morris may
have prevented free riding of a sort but it also would have denied access
to data. Neither the restriction in Sylvania nor that in Butler had that
dual effect.
147. Id.
148. Cont'l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977); Consultants &
Designers, Inc. v. Butler Serv. Group, Inc., 720 F.2d 1553, 1556 (11 th Cir. 1983).
149. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54 ("Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by
allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products.").
150. Butler, 720 F.2d at 1555. The benefit provided by the agency was that it had a supply of
workers for short-term jobs. Id. If it were declared unreasonable to protect this benefit the
agency would be unable to provide any value. Id.
151. Morris, 364 F.3d at 1291.
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More critically, neither Sylvania nor Butler touched upon intellectual
property. While an argument could be made that the restriction in
Sylvania was indirectly connected to the development of a trademark
through its effect on the promotion of a brand, the key concern for the
Court there was customer service and advertising. In Butler, there was
no intellectual property at issue, and the sole issue was the agency's
investment in a certain type of effort. Therefore, neither case implicated
intellectual property in the same way as did the Morris case, in which
the central issue was the extent to which antitrust law could be used to
expand intellectual property. As a result, the reliance by the Eleventh
Circuit on the Sylvania and Butler cases was inappropriate. Instead, the
court should have more carefully considered the business justification in
light of the intellectual property policies at stake.
B. Reconciling Topco's ImproperRejection of Free Riding
Justificationswith Morris's UncriticalAcceptance
In Morris, the free riding justification should have been rejected
because its application created a conflict with copyright subject matter.
The contractual exclusion by the PGA allowed it to protect subject
matter that is expressly excluded from copyright protection. On the
other hand, allowing a free riding justification in Topco would not have
created such a conflict with trademark law or any other body of
intellectual property law since the type of free riding at issue was not
The
prevented by either patent, copyright, or trademark laws.
name
for
intellectual property issue in Topco was the use of the Topco
15 2As a result, the Supreme Court's acceptance of the free
branding.
riding justification raised in Topco would not have interfered with the
Congressional policy of intellectual property. But a lack of conflict
with intellectual property subject matter is not a sufficient condition for
accepting a free riding justification for exclusionary conduct. The
problem with Topco was that the Court's rejection of the free riding
justification created a possible conflict with the policy goals of
trademark law to foster strong marks and brand names in order to avoid
consumer confusion and stimulate competition.
C. The Eleventh CircuitIgnored the Rule of Trinko
The use of antitrust law to expand intellectual property is contrary to

152. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 602 (1971) (striking down an
agreement among independent grocers to restrict competition through the creation of a new
brand); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, at 221 (discussing the origins of trademark law). The
use of trademarks is a method producers use to protect their brands. Id.
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the analysis of Trinko. 153 As discussed above, the Supreme Court
indicated in Trinko that judges may not second-guess Congress's
legislative decisions regarding whether or not an industry is a
monopoly. 154 The problem was that the Eleventh Circuit did exactly
this in Morris when it second-guessed Congress's judgments on the
scope of the monopoly protection granted under intellectual property
laws. By allowing the PGA to protect real-time scores using a business
justification analogous to that used for intellectual property, the
Eleventh Circuit implicitly expanded the scope of the intellectual
property grant to include what Congress exempted: data.
D. The Morris Decision Raises ConstitutionalProblems
In Morris, the Eleventh Circuit created a potential constitutional
conflict by using antitrust law to expand the boundaries of intellectual
property. Congress enacted antitrust law pursuant to its Commerce
Clause powers, which permit Congress "to regulate Commerce...
among the several States." 15 5 Copyright and patent laws, on the other
hand, were enacted pursuant to Congress's power "to promote progress
in Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 156 In its decision in Feist, the Supreme Court held that
facts, such as the real-time golf scores at issue in Morris, are not
protected under Congress's power to enact copyright and patent laws
because facts are not "writings" under the Constitution. 157 In Morris,
however, facts were allowed to be protected through the antitrust laws,
which flow from Congress's Commerce Clause powers. In expanding
intellectual property protection through the antitrust laws, the Eleventh
Circuit ignored the implied limitation that the Intellectual Property
Clause places on the Commerce Clause: Congress cannot enact
legislation under its Commerce Clause powers that it would be unable
to enact under its Intellectual Property Clause powers.
The academic argument for implied limitations flowing from the
Intellectual Property Clause has been made recently by Professors
153. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (discussing Trinko's narrow analysis of
the Sherman Act).
154. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409

(2004).
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1895) (recognizing Congress's power to enact antitrust laws under its Commerce Clause
powers).
156. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192 (2003)
(discussing Congress's power to create copyright and patent statutes).
157. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
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Heald and Sherry. 15 8 As they point out, the problem with the implied
limitation argument is that it may prove too much. 159 For example, if
the Intellectual Property Clause implies a limitation on the Commerce
Clause power, then by symmetry the Commerce Clause power implies a
limitation on the Intellectual Property Clause. 160 However, copyright
and patent law protects writings and inventions that are created wholly
intra-state and never commercialized interstate, but no one is suggesting
that extending copyright and patent to wholly intra-state writings and
inventions is unconstitutional. Similarly, while the Court has held that
trademark legislation cannot be enacted under the Intellectual Property
Clause, because trademarks are not "writings,, 16 1 the Lanham Act,1 62
which is the current legislation protecting trademarks, is a perfectly
constitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause power.163 The implied
limitations, Professors Heald and Sherry conclude, have to be based on
the policies underlying the specific enumerated lwer and that inform
legislation enacted under the respective power.
They identify four
policies that inform the implied limitation analysis under the Intellectual
Property Clause: the Suspect Grant Principle, the Quid Pro Quo
16 5
Principle, the Authorship Principle, and the Public Domain Principle.
The Suspect Grant Principle states that monopoly grants should be
based on the merits. The Quid Pro Quo Principle states that society
should be getting something in return for the monopoly grant. The
Authorship Principle states that the grant should be given to reward true
originality and creativity. Finally, the Public Domain Principle states
that the grant should be limited and enrich the public domain.
Each of these four principles is implicated by the Morris decision.
By extending intellectual property-like protection to data under the
antitrust law, the Eleventh Circuit created a suspect grant, one that
creates a monopoly in real-time golf scores. On this point, there is a
potential circularity since the very point of the Eleventh Circuit's
decision was to conclude that there was no illegal monopoly. The court
158. See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constrainton Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 1119
(2000) (arguing that the intellectual property clause absolutely constrains Congress's power).
159. ld.at 1125.
160. Id. at 1160.
161. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (distinguishing trademark
registration from writings and discoveries).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000 & West Supp. 2002).
163. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 158, at 1159 (addressing intellectual property and
constitutional law).
164. Id. at 1160.
165. Id. at 1160-66.
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should have addressed the intellectual property issues more closely in
order to avoid a conflict between intellectual property and competition
policies. More saliently, the Eleventh Circuit's extension of protection
to data violates the Quid Pro Quo and Authorship Principles. The
Intellectual Property Clause clearly states that the exclusive grant is
given in exchange for "Progress of Science and useful Arts." 16 6 It is not
clear how the public is benefited by protecting the PGA's exclusive
rights, especially when denying access to the media potentially limits
the public's access to the information. Furthermore, the Authorship
Principle rests on the need for intellectual property to protect creative
efforts, as opposed to the sweat of the brow. In the case of real-time
golf scores, the PGA is not creating anything new; it is simply reporting
information produced as a by-product of the tournaments. Finally, the
extension of intellectual property rights to data through antitrust law
violates the Public Domain Principle. The Supreme Court in Feist held
that facts are relegated to the public domain for all to use. 167 By making
the real-time golf scores private, the Eleventh Circuit narrowed the
scope of the public domain as defined by the intellectual property
clause. For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Morris
created a constitutional conflict by ignoring the implied limitations on
Congress's Commerce Clause powers from the Intellectual Property
Clause.
Precedent from bankruptcy law illustrates the potential problem
created in Morris. The Supreme Court, in Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n. v. Gibbons, invalidated legislation enacted by Congress under its
Commerce Clause powers to protect employees of the reorganized
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company."' The Court
found that the legislation was in conflict with the uniformity
requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause, which grants Congress the
authority to pass bankruptcy law as long as it is uniform across all the
states. 169 As the Court stated:
We do not understand either appellant or the United States to argue
that Congress may enact bankruptcy laws pursuant to its power under
the Commerce Clause. Unlike the Commerce Clause, the Bankruptcy
Clause itself contains an affirmative limitation or restriction upon
Congress' power: bankruptcy laws must be uniform throughout the
United States. Such uniformity in the applicability of legislation is not

166.
167.
168.
169.

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457,469-71 (1982).
Id. at 458.
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17 0
required by the Commerce Clause.
The Court's logic in Gibbons applies with equal force to Morris.
Antitrust law cannot expand intellectual property law. If antitrust law
conflicts with intellectual property law, the application of antitrust law
must give way to the limits of Congress's intellectual property powers.
By allowing the PGA to protect data through an intellectual propertylike justification, the Eleventh Circuit ignored the implied limits from
the Intellectual Property Clause. At the minimum, the court should
have considered these limits in assessing the PGA's business
justification.

V. PROPOSAL: A CAUTIOUS REVIEW OF EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT IS
NECESSARY

There are two reasons for a more cautious antitrust review of
exclusionary conduct when intellectual property is involved. First,
intellectual property has its own free riding rationale.1 7 1 Intellectual
property law recognizes the value of appropriation through doctrines
that promote the public domain: limited terms, fair use, and nonappropriable subject matter. 172 Since intellectual property contains its
own balancing of the benefits and costs of free riding, this balancing
should be taken into consideration when antitrust law intersects with the
territory of intellectual property, as it almost certainly did in Morris and
implicitly in Topco.
Second, intellectual property law and antitrust law are tools created
by Congress to address innovation policy and competition
respectively. 17 3
When antitrust law encroaches on what has
traditionally been the domain of intellectual property, care must be
taken that competition and innovation policy are promoted
consistently. 17 4 The decision in Morris seemingly reconciles the two by
allowing an exclusionary restriction in order to promote the creation of
innovative services by the PGA. The problem with this logic is that the
alleged reconciliation struck by the court conflicts with the policy
decision to place data in the public domain. 175 Striking down the
170. Id. at 468.
171. See supra Part II.A (outlining the history and purposes of intellectual property law).
172. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm,
54 DuKE L.J. 1, 44-52 (2004) (discussing the balance between free speech and copyright
protection).
173. Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite
Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1053 (2003).
174. Id. at 1052-53.
175. See Wendy Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, LAW & COMTEMP.
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restriction as making data proprietary would have176been more consistent
with the balance within intellectual property law.
The dilemma posed by Morris can be stated succinctly. The free
riding rationale usually accepted within antitrust law is to allow
restrictions that promote the creation of valuable services, such as the
collection and publishing of real-time golf scores. The free riding
rationale within intellectual property law, specifically copyright law,
leaves data in the public domain unless they are arranged, coordinated,
and selected in a creatively original manner. The dilemma can be
resolved just as readily. If copyright law applied to the product created
by the PGA, then the contractual restrictions would be unnecessary.
Antitrust law should not permit what copyright law excludes.
This Part presents some general legal principles to structure the
balance between antitrust and intellectual property in the treatment of
free riding.
A. Courts Should Follow the Analysis of the Lexmark Decision
Often antitrust concerns arise within the context of an intellectual
property dispute. For example, in many of the peer-to-peer (P2P) cases,
the copyright defendant unsuccessfully raised antitrust claims that the
music industry was bringing the copyright claims as a means to limit
competition for the distribution of music by shutting down alternative
distribution outlets. 177 These claims have been controversial because
these alternatives entail the distribution of free music, an alternative that
clearly threatens the established market for music. 178 A more subtle
version of the antitrust argument is that shutting down P2P networks
precludes the development of alternatives for pay distribution
mechanisms that compete with overpriced CDs.17 9 The antitrust claims
have been unsuccessful because courts have found that the copyright
policies outweigh the spurious competitive benefits of P2P.
PROBS., Spring 1992, at 93, 94 (addressing the Supreme Court's determination that allowing facts
to be privately owned "is simply more costly than society can afford[]").
176. Id. at 105.
177. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that plaintiffs must first provide notice to Napster of the availability of copyrighted works before
Napster has a duty to disable access to the copyrighted material).
178. See Shubha Ghosh, Turning Gray into Green: Some Comments on Napster, 23

HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 563, 572-579 (2001) (discussing Napster, file-sharing and the
distribution of music). See also Michael W. Carroll, The Struggle for Music Copyright, 57 FLA.

L. REv. 907 (2005) (discussing the evolution of music copyright law).
179. Ghosh, supra note 178, at 575.
180. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 923 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(rejecting antitrust defense against preliminary injunction), aft'd, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Admittedly, when framed in terms of free music, the antitrust claims are
vexing and not persuasive. But this does not mean that antitrust claims
are not viable. In fact, within copyright law, specifically in the analysis
of market effects under fair use, there is room, and arguably a mandate,
to consider the competitive effects of not allowing the alleged
infringement of copyright.
An excellent example of such an analysis is provided by the Sixth
Circuit in the Lexmark case, 18 1 in which a printer manufacturer
attempted to enjoin the manufacturer of a competing cartridge by
alleging that the software within the cartridge, designed to be
compatible with the software in the printer, violated the printer
manufacturer's copyright.
Lexmark's purpose for installing the
software was so that only they could refill their ink cartridges. 182 Static
Control Components then produced a microchip which could be used so
that Lexmark ink cartridges could be recycled and refilled by third
parties at a reduced cost. 18 3 The Court agreed that Lexmark's software
184
was protected as a "literary work" under the copyright laws.
However ultimately, the Sixth Circuit rejected Lexmark's claim on
several grounds, including the argument that the cartridge
manufacturer's use of the software was fair use.1 85 The court's fair use
analysis expressly relied upon the rationale that enjoining the use of the
software would have anticompetitive effects in the cartridge industry.
B. The ECJ DecisionsAlso Provide Guidance to U.S. Courts
The ECJ's decisions in Magill and IMS contrast with the decision in
Morris on the identical issue of the treatment of information as a
product. While the ECJ decisions limit the ability of a monopolist to
control access to indispensable data, the Morris decision allows such
monopoly control in order for a company to recoup fixed costs and
prevent free riding. The ECJ decisions do not ignore the fixed costs
issue, but allow for their recoupment through the use of compulsory
Under United States law, by contrast, compulsory
licensing. 186
licensing is extra-ordinary, imposed by courts as a remedial measure in

181. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 528 (6th Cir.
2004).
182. Id. at 529-30.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 533.
185. Id. at551.
186. See supra Part II.C.4 (discussing the decisions of the European Court of Justice
addressing antitrust and intellectual property disputes).
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unusual circumstances or if mandated expressly by Congress. 18 7 As a
result, courts like the Eleventh Circuit that are confronted with disputes
over monopoly control over data are left with two options: either to find
a violation of the antitrust law and permit access or to take the tack in
the Morris decision itself and find no violation. The middle ground of
compulsory licensing is unavailable in the United States, except in
extraordinary
cases or in the event Congress creates a special
18 8
remedy.

Nonetheless, the ECJ cases provide some guidance for how to
analyze cases like Morris. The source of the problem in Morris is the
deference the court gives to the business justification offered by the
monopolist. Specifically, the court allows the monopolist to use
intellectual property rationale to expand the scope of copyright and
patent law beyond what Congress and the Constitution allows. To
avoid this conflict, the court should have carefully scrutinized the
business justification presented by the defendant. In the IMS case, for
example, the ECJ requires scrutiny of the indispensability of the
information structure through consideration of the costs of creating
alternatives to the structure.
In Morris, by analogy, the court should
have required the defendant to demonstrate a closer connection between
the business justification offered and the actual business plan used.
Under this proposal, if the business plan that the PGA used allowed it to
recoup more than its fixed costs or to earn what economists call "extranormal rents" through its limitations on access to data, then the court
would show less deference to the business justification. Short of
Congress acting decisively to limit the misuses of antitrust law in cases
like Morris, this proposal will work to properly balance intellectual
property and competition policy within the current framework for
antitrust analysis in the United States.

187. See Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory
Licensing of PharmaceuticalsHurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 862-64 (2003)
(describing uses of compulsory licensing in the United States).
188. Congress has created compulsory licensing in the music and television industries as part
of legislative compromises within copyright law. 17 U.S.C. § 104 (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 119 (2000
& West Supp. 2005). Special provisions of the Atomic Energy Commission Act also permit
compulsory licensing if necessary for the public interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2000) (providing
special procedures for patents involving nuclear material or atomic energy). For a discussion of
the use of compulsory licensing as an antitrust remedy, see generally Lawrence Schlam,
Compulsory Royalty-Free Licensing as an Antitrust Remedy for Patent Fraud: Law, Policy and
the Patent-AntitrustInterface Revisited, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 467 (1998).
189. IMS, 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The relationship between intellectual property and antitrust is
intricate. While on the one hand intellectual property law grants
federally created rights to exclude to inventors and authors, antitrust
places restrictions on exclusionary conduct that is harmful to
competition. The Morris case presents a fresh variation on the
intellectual property-antitrust conundrum by illustrating that antitrust
law may permit the expansion of intellectual property rights by allowing
free riding as a business justification for exclusionary conduct. This
Article has made the argument against such an expansion of intellectual
property rights by the recommendation that courts pay special attention
to the application of the free riding rationale when intellectual property
law is implicated.
The use of free riding as a business justification in antitrust raises
broader issues of the appropriateness of free riding as a justification for
legal protections accorded to business in the competitive process. To
say that a person requires legal protection because of free riding is a
seductive argument. Claims that certain activity steals the fruit of
someone's labor or is an illegal misappropriation of someone's gains,
however, disguise the question of entitlement and assumes that the
creator is entitled to completely appropriate the value of what she has
created. This broad claim of entitlement conflicts with the spirit of
creative destruction in competition and the benefits of sharing in an
intellectual property commons. Once the prevention of free riding is
recognized as the granting of the legal right to exclude, the focus of the
inquiry becomes better directed to the more difficult question of
whether someone should be given the absolute right to prevent someone
from using the fruits of her creation. In a case like Morris, this difficult
question translates into who should control and have access to
information. If access to information is being excluded, the justification
should not be limited solely to considerations of the costs of producing
the information. Such a narrow consideration ignores the benefits to
society from open access and the more specific beneficial uses of the
party seeking access.
The facts of Morris are unique, but the legal issues raised by the case
are far from idiosyncratic. At the same time that information "wants to
be free," information has been modified and channeled through the
marketplace. It is important that a judicious reading and application of
intellectual property and antitrust laws prevent the market from
becoming an iron cage for information. The decision in Morris
provides the materials for such a cage. Hopefully, this Article's
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proposal can serve as a key to ensure that information finds some
degree of freedom within the structures of the marketplace.

